Recently gold prices have touched a new record, almost reaching 1200$ per ounce. As usual, when some kind of asset reaches record prices, be it stocks, bonds, real estates or commodities, it gets a lot of attention from the media and the investors community.
But why gold prices have risen so much in the last 8 years, rising to 1200$/ounce from 300$/ounce, an advance of 300%? Are fundamentals responsible for this advance or is there also some kind of speculation behind it? At today prices can we expect to get satisfable returns from gold as a long term investment?
I will try to give my answers to those questions.
Historically, gold has 2 distinct properties which distinguish it from all the other commodities and assets:
- It is an inflation hedge: it's nominal return mimicks the inflation rate over long periods of time
- It is perceived like an hedge against financial crisis and geopolitical instability, meaning that, at last teorically, gold will mantain it's value or even increase it even during an economic depression or wars.
Having avoided financial disaster in late 2008/early 2009 i believe that right now the second property matters little for the market.
The first one could be much more important in explaining the sharp rise in gold prices during 2009. The record amounts of fiscal and monetary stimulus that goverments injected in their economies to prevent a new depression and deflationary pressures could have unpleasant after effects, specifically in the form of high rates of inflation in the next years.
Let's take a look at a graph which shows gold prices in nominal and real terms from 1914 to these days:
By looking at this graph, you may understand why i think that the most important fundamental in explaining gold intrinsic value from a long term perspective is inflation. Of course supply and demand, particulary investment demand, affect gold prices, but they affect them more in the short-medium term than in the long term. In the long term what will affect the prices of gold is inflation, because gold performance will tend to mirror inflation. At last in an economy that works well over the long term like the US economy.
If gold performance mirrors inflation over very long periods of time, over a sufficently long period of time gold real yield must be 0% or at least be very close to 0%. Siegel in his work, "Stocks for the long run", shows that over a 200 years time span gold has had a real return near 0%. This strenghtens my thesis.
This doesn't mean that gold real return in the short-medium term can't be higher/lower that the historical mean which is near 0%. That's because gold prices, like the prices of all the other assets be them equities, bonds or real estate, are affected in the short-medium term by emotional and speculative forces which can push the asset away from it's intrinsic value to overvalued/undervalued valutations. But because these factors are only temporary, over a sufficiently long run period their effects disappear and there is a ruturn to the historical mean real yield.
We can see from the graph that gold is undervalued and can be a good long term investment when it's real return has been negative. Like in 1997-2001, because in the 1914-1997 period it had been underperforming inflation.
That's not the case right now. The bull market of the last 8 years has changed drammatically the situation: today gold nominal return has overperformed the inflation rate in the 1914-2009 period, and it's real return in that period has been much higher than 0%. Gold has been more expensive in real terms only the the period between the '70s and the '80s, when it seemed that the FED had lost it's control on inflation. After that period you can see that it's performance has been pretty disappointing.
This means that gold today is already discounting a sharp increase in the inflation in the next years and beacause of this by purchasing it at todat prices you may lose a substantial part of it's hedeging properties.
That's why i think that at the actual prices gold is overvalued.
Personally to protect myself from inflation i prefer goverment bonds which are indexed to the inflation rate. Differently from gold they also offer an income in the form of the coupons in addition to the hedging of the principal. Over a sufficiently long period of time this makes a substainstial difference.
Monday, November 23, 2009
Sunday, November 15, 2009
Shorting long term Bonds: Db X-Trackers II Short Iboxx Sovereigns Eurozone Total Retun Index ETF
I have put this ETF in my portfolio at 112,9 with the idea to double my position if it's price falls of another 4%-5%.
The reason is simple: the actual market phase which started in march 2009 presents a strong anomaly: normally when equity and High Yield bonds jump sovreing bonds suffer, because of the unwinding of the "fly to quality" and the subsequent huge transfer of liquidity between asset classes with different risks. This time around instead every asset class is rising in price... corporate IG and HY bonds, equity, sovreing bonds... like if a schizophrenic response is following the generalized plunge in assets prices of 4Q2008 and 1Q2009, which was equally abnormal and caused mainly by psicological reasons.
If in march the misprincing in equity seemed pretty clear, now the mispricing in european sovreing bonds is equally evident.
The market is betting on low inflation and a very low level of interest rates for a long time due to a weak recovery in the economic activity, while i consider more likely a solid rebound in economic activity and an acceleration of inflation in 2010-2011.
If in march the mispricing on equities seemed pretty obiouvs, now the mispricing on european sovereign bond seem almost as obiuvs.
As we can see from the graph european governemen bonds reached their cycle lows in mid 2008, a few months before the daflut of Lehman Brothers, when commodities reached record high prices and the European Central Bank was determined to fight inflation during a phase of high uncertainty for the european and world economy.
The gold period for these securities started after the failer of Lehman Borthers, thanks to central banks reducing interest rates and to a strong fly to quality on the stronger issuers (France and Germany), caused by a fears of a new great depression and deflation threats.
I don't know for how long the rise in the price of these securities can go on, but i know one thing: it can't go on forever.
After putting down the basic idea after the investment, let's take a look on the charateristics of the ETF.
In my opinion it's not an instrument adequate for long term investment, because it shorts a total return index (this means that the coupons are reinvested in the index). But i think that it can work for medium term investments of no more than 4-5 years, if used in a rational way.
To compensate the fact that it shorts a total return index the ETF is remunerated by an interst rate than is 2 times the EONIA interest rate minus the cost on management of the fund (0,15% of total asset under management).
The medium maturity of the securities that compose the index is 8 years, so it pretty sensible to the change in long term interest rates.
To confirm this we can look at the long term graph of the Iboxx short Eurozone index, Iboxx Eurozone Index and 8 y EUR yield benchmark:
Looking at the period between 2005 and mid 2008, during which the ECB raised interest rates, you can see a significant appreciation of the Iboxx short eurozone index.
The reason is simple: the actual market phase which started in march 2009 presents a strong anomaly: normally when equity and High Yield bonds jump sovreing bonds suffer, because of the unwinding of the "fly to quality" and the subsequent huge transfer of liquidity between asset classes with different risks. This time around instead every asset class is rising in price... corporate IG and HY bonds, equity, sovreing bonds... like if a schizophrenic response is following the generalized plunge in assets prices of 4Q2008 and 1Q2009, which was equally abnormal and caused mainly by psicological reasons.
If in march the misprincing in equity seemed pretty clear, now the mispricing in european sovreing bonds is equally evident.
The market is betting on low inflation and a very low level of interest rates for a long time due to a weak recovery in the economic activity, while i consider more likely a solid rebound in economic activity and an acceleration of inflation in 2010-2011.
If in march the mispricing on equities seemed pretty obiouvs, now the mispricing on european sovereign bond seem almost as obiuvs.
As we can see from the graph european governemen bonds reached their cycle lows in mid 2008, a few months before the daflut of Lehman Brothers, when commodities reached record high prices and the European Central Bank was determined to fight inflation during a phase of high uncertainty for the european and world economy.
The gold period for these securities started after the failer of Lehman Borthers, thanks to central banks reducing interest rates and to a strong fly to quality on the stronger issuers (France and Germany), caused by a fears of a new great depression and deflation threats.
I don't know for how long the rise in the price of these securities can go on, but i know one thing: it can't go on forever.
After putting down the basic idea after the investment, let's take a look on the charateristics of the ETF.
In my opinion it's not an instrument adequate for long term investment, because it shorts a total return index (this means that the coupons are reinvested in the index). But i think that it can work for medium term investments of no more than 4-5 years, if used in a rational way.
To compensate the fact that it shorts a total return index the ETF is remunerated by an interst rate than is 2 times the EONIA interest rate minus the cost on management of the fund (0,15% of total asset under management).
The medium maturity of the securities that compose the index is 8 years, so it pretty sensible to the change in long term interest rates.
To confirm this we can look at the long term graph of the Iboxx short Eurozone index, Iboxx Eurozone Index and 8 y EUR yield benchmark:
Looking at the period between 2005 and mid 2008, during which the ECB raised interest rates, you can see a significant appreciation of the Iboxx short eurozone index.
Labels:
short,
shorting,
sovereign bonds
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Stock analysis: Geox spa - the breathing shoe's corporation - part 2
Let's continue our analysis by looking at the company reclassified cash flow statement:
Cash flow from operations contracted 28,5% to 83,557 m from 116,758 m, mainly due to reduction in other non cash items and an increase/decrease in other current asset/liabilities.
This contraction, coupled with heavy net Cap Ex (94 m - a record for the company) mainly allocated to new store openings (especially flagship stores in key strategic locations), caused the free cash flow to turn negative to -10,74 m from 74 m in 2007.
The negative free cash flow and the 62 m the company payed in dividends had a considerable impact on company's net financial position, which was partially mitigated by the gains in the fair-value of derivative contracts used to hedge against currency fluctuations.
The surplus in the net financial position decreased to 58,2 m from 106,7 m. This actually isn't bad news since keeping a lot of cash for long periods of time without investing it or distributing it destroys value for the shareholders. For 2009 Geox has decided to reduce the Cap Ex to around 45 m and to keep the dividend unchanged in order to maintain a solid financial profile.
The increase in the net operating working capital (NOWC = inventories + accounts payble - accounts receivable) soaked up 42 mln of cash flow. The net revenues/NWC ratio increased to 22,9% from 21,7% , this impacted negatively the ROA. The increase in the ratio is caused by inventories growing more than net revenues:
Looking at the balance sheet we can observe that inventories grew 22,3%, accounts receivable 15,3% and accounts payable 17% against an increase of 16% in sales.
PROFITABILITY:
As a result of reduced profit margins and invested capital expanding more than revenue Geox profitability fell in 2008:
- ROA2008 26% vs ROA2007 32,7%
- ROE2008 27,5% vs ROE2007 34,5%
- OCF2008/PN2008 vs OCF2007/PN2008 32,7% (OCF = operating cash flow)
Although it's slowing due to the recession and it's effects on consumer spending, profitabilty remains on very high levels. In fact high retuns on capital invested and efficient capital allocation is one of the things i like about the company.
As a final consideration we can observe by looking at these figurest that Geox autofinanced it's exceptional growth in the past five years with it's solid cash flows while managing to mantain a solid financial position and good returns on invested capital during the years. This isn't a so common thing in the italian corporation scenery, and is a good testament to the company and it's management.
Cash flow from operations contracted 28,5% to 83,557 m from 116,758 m, mainly due to reduction in other non cash items and an increase/decrease in other current asset/liabilities.
This contraction, coupled with heavy net Cap Ex (94 m - a record for the company) mainly allocated to new store openings (especially flagship stores in key strategic locations), caused the free cash flow to turn negative to -10,74 m from 74 m in 2007.
The negative free cash flow and the 62 m the company payed in dividends had a considerable impact on company's net financial position, which was partially mitigated by the gains in the fair-value of derivative contracts used to hedge against currency fluctuations.
The surplus in the net financial position decreased to 58,2 m from 106,7 m. This actually isn't bad news since keeping a lot of cash for long periods of time without investing it or distributing it destroys value for the shareholders. For 2009 Geox has decided to reduce the Cap Ex to around 45 m and to keep the dividend unchanged in order to maintain a solid financial profile.
The increase in the net operating working capital (NOWC = inventories + accounts payble - accounts receivable) soaked up 42 mln of cash flow. The net revenues/NWC ratio increased to 22,9% from 21,7% , this impacted negatively the ROA. The increase in the ratio is caused by inventories growing more than net revenues:
Looking at the balance sheet we can observe that inventories grew 22,3%, accounts receivable 15,3% and accounts payable 17% against an increase of 16% in sales.
PROFITABILITY:
As a result of reduced profit margins and invested capital expanding more than revenue Geox profitability fell in 2008:
- ROA2008 26% vs ROA2007 32,7%
- ROE2008 27,5% vs ROE2007 34,5%
- OCF2008/PN2008 vs OCF2007/PN2008 32,7% (OCF = operating cash flow)
Although it's slowing due to the recession and it's effects on consumer spending, profitabilty remains on very high levels. In fact high retuns on capital invested and efficient capital allocation is one of the things i like about the company.
As a final consideration we can observe by looking at these figurest that Geox autofinanced it's exceptional growth in the past five years with it's solid cash flows while managing to mantain a solid financial position and good returns on invested capital during the years. This isn't a so common thing in the italian corporation scenery, and is a good testament to the company and it's management.
Labels:
fundamental analysis,
geox,
stock analysis
Saturday, March 14, 2009
Stock analysis: Geox spa - the breathing shoe's corporation
Geox spa is one of my favourites blue chips on the Italian stock market. Geox creates, produces, promotes and distributes patented shoe and apparel products all over the world. It operates in the men's, women's and children's classic, casual, sports and fashion business.
Geox main competitive advantages are:
Let's take a look at Geox 2008 results (the images are taken from Geox 2008 financial statements):
Net sales were up 16% thanks to new store openings. Comparable DOS (directly operated stores opened for at least 1 year) sales were up 3%.
The rise in sales was not enough to offset the strong increase in general and administrative expenses, caused mainly by new store openings, especially flagship stores.
As a result EBIT margin contracted to 19,1% from 23,4%.
Net profit margin contracted less to 13,2% from 16% thanks to a lower tax rate (29,2% in 2008 vs 31% in 2007) due to a one time fiscal item.
EBIT and net income were also negatively affected by asset impairments by 2 mln and 5,9 mln respectively. Diluted EPS were 0,45 in 2008 vs 0,48 in 2007, a contraction of 6,25%.
Let's take a closer look at sales:
Geox is trying to further expand it's sales by selling apparel equipped with it's breathing technology in addiction to shoes. Due to it's high growth rate apparel is becoming increasingly more important as a source of revenue for Geox. In 2008 it generated 9,4% of net revenues as opposed to 6,7% in 2007, with a grow rate of 62,5% compared to 12,5% for shoes.
Geox main market is it's home market, Italy, which generated 37,3% of it's sales in 2008. In the last years the company successfully expanded in other European countries like Germany, France, Spain, Austria, in the US and in emerging markets (rest of the world). If you look at past balance sheets you can see than the company is progressively expanding the percentage of revenue generated outside Italy. In 2008 it continued to purse this strategy with important Cap Ex (capital expenditures) - roughly 94 mln euro - committed to opening new DOS (especially flagship stores) all over the world.
As you can see in the image the percentage of sales generated in DOS sales has increased in the last year, increasing to 15,8% from 13,1%, while the percercentage of revenue generated in franchising stores remained stable at 16%.
...to be continued...
Geox main competitive advantages are:
- Technology: constant focus on the product with the application of innovative and technological solutions developed by Geox and protected by patents.
- Focus on the consumer: cross-market positioning for products, with a vast range of shoes for men, women and children in the medium to medium/high price range (family brand).
- Brand recognition: strong recognition of the Geox brand thanks to an effective communication strategy and its identification by the consumer with the "breathing" concept.
- Internationalization: a growing presence on international markets thanks to easy replication of a business model already tried and tested in Italy.
- Distribution: a network of monobrand Geox Shops in Italy and abroad which has been developed according to each country's distribution structure and calibrated to the widespread network of multibrand clients. The goal of both networks is to optimize market share and, at the same time, to promote the Geox brand to end-consumers on a consistent basis.
- Supply chain: a flexible delocalized business model with considerable outsourcing, capable of efficiently managing the production and logistics cycle while the Company maintains control over critical phases of the value chain, so as to ensure product quality and timely deliveries.
Let's take a look at Geox 2008 results (the images are taken from Geox 2008 financial statements):
Net sales were up 16% thanks to new store openings. Comparable DOS (directly operated stores opened for at least 1 year) sales were up 3%.
The rise in sales was not enough to offset the strong increase in general and administrative expenses, caused mainly by new store openings, especially flagship stores.
As a result EBIT margin contracted to 19,1% from 23,4%.
Net profit margin contracted less to 13,2% from 16% thanks to a lower tax rate (29,2% in 2008 vs 31% in 2007) due to a one time fiscal item.
EBIT and net income were also negatively affected by asset impairments by 2 mln and 5,9 mln respectively. Diluted EPS were 0,45 in 2008 vs 0,48 in 2007, a contraction of 6,25%.
Let's take a closer look at sales:
Geox is trying to further expand it's sales by selling apparel equipped with it's breathing technology in addiction to shoes. Due to it's high growth rate apparel is becoming increasingly more important as a source of revenue for Geox. In 2008 it generated 9,4% of net revenues as opposed to 6,7% in 2007, with a grow rate of 62,5% compared to 12,5% for shoes.
Geox main market is it's home market, Italy, which generated 37,3% of it's sales in 2008. In the last years the company successfully expanded in other European countries like Germany, France, Spain, Austria, in the US and in emerging markets (rest of the world). If you look at past balance sheets you can see than the company is progressively expanding the percentage of revenue generated outside Italy. In 2008 it continued to purse this strategy with important Cap Ex (capital expenditures) - roughly 94 mln euro - committed to opening new DOS (especially flagship stores) all over the world.
As you can see in the image the percentage of sales generated in DOS sales has increased in the last year, increasing to 15,8% from 13,1%, while the percercentage of revenue generated in franchising stores remained stable at 16%.
...to be continued...
Labels:
fundamental analysis,
geox,
stock analysis
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
Why Volatility isn't an adequate measure of risk
Nowadays, the most popular indicator of a security's risk is volatility. As we all know volatility measures how much the price of a security has fluctuated in the past. People see volatility as a risk indicator because, they say, if you buy a high volatility security you will expose yourself to a greater drop in the security value than if you buy one with low volatility. That's true, but the price movements that occur in the short term hardly tell something about the intrinsic risks of a business.
It's no surprise that this statistical concept has become so popular in modern markets dominated by traders which operate with very short time horizons. Those market players generally don't act on a value basis and don't know the characteristic of the business they buy or sell, instead their operations are based on their ideas of future price movements. To them, a simple price fluctuation based indicator like volatility appears very useful. They use it to estimate the potential loss/gain of a trade.
Unfortunately for them they learned the hard way one of the shortcomings of volatility: what happens tomorrow may be really different than what has happened in the last day, month or year. In 2008 while stock kept falling volatility drastically increased, reaching peaks not seen since 1987 in September-October after Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Short term investors experienced bigger adverse developments in market prices than what they had estimated using volatility, beta and VAR. That's why many traders and hedge funds were utterly crushed by the market in the meltdown after September 15th.
The volatility of the S&P 500 is now higher than in 2006-1H 2007, but it's price is much lower. If one values risk on volatility he would come to the conclusion that the S&P is now much riskier than in 2006-1H2007. This is against any sound reasoning. How in the world can you assume a higher risk if you buy something at a much lower price?
Let's suppose than in year T you estimate that the stock of X corporation has an intrinsic value of 100. It's market price is 110 and it's volatility 20%. In year T+1 it's price falls to 60, it's volatility increases while it's intrinsic value is little changed. By buying something worth around 100 at 60 you would have an adequate margin of safety reducing significantly the risk of permanent losses, still volatility indicates than the risk of the security has increased! The intelligent investor understands that this is total nonsense and uses other reasonable methods of risk measurement.
The last problem with volatility is that it doesn't tell nothing about the intrinsc business risks. You will have to study the business until you understand it and read the financial statements to have a grasp of the intrinsic risk of a complex thing like a corporation.
It's no surprise that this statistical concept has become so popular in modern markets dominated by traders which operate with very short time horizons. Those market players generally don't act on a value basis and don't know the characteristic of the business they buy or sell, instead their operations are based on their ideas of future price movements. To them, a simple price fluctuation based indicator like volatility appears very useful. They use it to estimate the potential loss/gain of a trade.
Unfortunately for them they learned the hard way one of the shortcomings of volatility: what happens tomorrow may be really different than what has happened in the last day, month or year. In 2008 while stock kept falling volatility drastically increased, reaching peaks not seen since 1987 in September-October after Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Short term investors experienced bigger adverse developments in market prices than what they had estimated using volatility, beta and VAR. That's why many traders and hedge funds were utterly crushed by the market in the meltdown after September 15th.
The volatility of the S&P 500 is now higher than in 2006-1H 2007, but it's price is much lower. If one values risk on volatility he would come to the conclusion that the S&P is now much riskier than in 2006-1H2007. This is against any sound reasoning. How in the world can you assume a higher risk if you buy something at a much lower price?
Let's suppose than in year T you estimate that the stock of X corporation has an intrinsic value of 100. It's market price is 110 and it's volatility 20%. In year T+1 it's price falls to 60, it's volatility increases while it's intrinsic value is little changed. By buying something worth around 100 at 60 you would have an adequate margin of safety reducing significantly the risk of permanent losses, still volatility indicates than the risk of the security has increased! The intelligent investor understands that this is total nonsense and uses other reasonable methods of risk measurement.
The last problem with volatility is that it doesn't tell nothing about the intrinsc business risks. You will have to study the business until you understand it and read the financial statements to have a grasp of the intrinsic risk of a complex thing like a corporation.
Labels:
risk indicators,
volatility
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